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INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0048  
IGAD COLLECTIVE  
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE  
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000893

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SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DJIBOUTI'S FM DISCUSSES REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON  
REVISING AMISOM

REF: 09 DJIBOUTI 881 (AND PREVIOUS); IIR 6 830 0100 09

CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S.  
Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A), (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A July 10 IGAD ministerial in Addis Ababa will address revising the African Union Mission in Somalia's (AMISOM) rules of engagement to allow it to take more robust military action against al-Shabaab extremists, according to Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Yousseuf. IGAD ministers are also expected to address whether states neighboring Somalia (most notably Kenya and Djibouti) should be permitted to deploy troops to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). More than 400 TFG recruits have now arrived in Djibouti for formal military training. Regional actors may seek additional measures to pressure Eritrea to end suspected arms shipments to al-Shabaab fighters, including UNSC sanctions. END SUMMARY.

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IGAD TO DISCUSS REVISING AMISOM'S MANDATE AND ROE  
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¶2. (C) In a July 9 meeting with Ambassador and DCM (note-taker), Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Yousseuf discussed the status of regional consultations on Somalia in advance of a July 10 IGAD ministerial in Addis Ababa. Citing al-Shabaab's "hit-and-run attacks" and use of propaganda to further its extremist aims, FM Yousseuf said the immediate challenge was to strengthen AMISOM. The July 10 IGAD ministerial would therefore address whether to permit frontline states neighboring Somalia (i.e., Kenya and Djibouti) to contribute troops, and would discuss changing AMISOM's rules of engagement to allow it to take more aggressive (i.e., Chapter VII) action. To improve command and control over day-to-day combat operations, TFG President Sheikh Sharif had discussed establishing a formal Somali military command, comprised of former officers of Somalia's (presumably Siad Barre-era) professional military, Yousseuf said.

¶3. (C) FM Yousseuf said Kenyan leadership was split on a potential Kenyan deployment to Somalia, with Prime Minister Raila Odinga "warm" to the idea, but President Mwai Kibaki and Defense Minister

Njenga Karume less supportive of a Kenyan deployment.

14. (C) Seeking stronger financial support for AMISOM and, especially, the TFG, Djibouti had engaged donors at the recently concluded AU Summit, Youssouf said. They included Arab League members (Iraq had reportedly pledged USD5 million), Japan (which had reiterated a pledge to release funds to AMISOM), the EU, Sweden, and Italy.

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DJIBOUTI TRAINS SOMALIA'S NEW NATIONAL ARMY  
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15. (C) Addressing the arrival this week of 403 Somali TFG recruits (63 of whom arrived on July 9) to begin formal military training in Djibouti (ref A), Youssouf underscored the imperative to "reboot" Somalia's security sector. Djibouti aimed at developing a national Somali army which, with reinforcement by AMISOM, could combat al-Shabaab fighters and safeguard Somalia's sovereignty. To create esprit de corps as a national institution loyal to the TFG, "intellectual training" of troops was as important as physical training. TFG President Sharif had asked Djibouti and other

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neighbors for training assistance, Youssouf said, noting that Addis and Kampala had been approached to provide unspecified logistical support.

16. (C) Ambassador reviewed USG assistance to Djibouti in support of TFG training (ref A), but also noted USG concerns relating to issues after training was completed (e.g., command and control, payment of salaries, return/reintegration in Somalia). Ambassador also highlighted the need for prior coordination with donors, as approval for post hoc reimbursement for training activities was difficult to obtain.

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NEED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON ERITREA  
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17. (C) FM Youssouf highlighted IGAD members' earlier call for a no-fly zone and naval blockade of Somalia's ports, particularly to block arms shipments from Eritrea. Sanctions (as discussed at the recently concluded AU Summit in Sirte) needed to target Eritrean government (GSE) leadership and parastatals, such as the Red Sea Training Corporation, not the people of Eritrea who were "already suffering." Observing that Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki was "capable of a lot, but he's not suicidal," Youssouf assessed that increased international pressure could induce Isaias to curtail material support for al-Shabaab. At the same time, however, FM Youssouf observed that Eritrean troops had continued since June 2008 to occupy Djiboutian territory at Ras Doumeira, and were now building a jetty there for the Eritrean navy.

18. (C) Within the UN Security Council (which was expected to meet July 9 on Somalia), Burkina Faso would have to take the lead (among African members) to introduce sanctions against Eritrea, Youssouf said, noting that Uganda could not do so as it currently held the

UNSC presidency. With the exception of Eritrea, all countries in the Horn of Africa appreciated the role of the United States, Youssouf asserted.

¶9. (C) Commenting on reports that Egypt sought to host a new reconciliation conference for Somalia, FM Youssouf agreed that the idea was likely a "trial balloon." Djibouti assessed that Egypt's interest in Somalia was motivated more by rivalry with Ethiopia over Nile River Basin water resources, than by an interest in helping Somalia's TFG. Indeed, on the Nile issue, Eritrea often backed Egypt and Sudan, against Ethiopia, Youssouf said.

¶10. (C) COMMENT. Djibouti, a key Muslim ally in the Horn of Africa, has been at the forefront of diplomatic and military efforts (ref B) to assist Somali TFG President Sheikh Sharif. The security threat posed by Sharif's extremist adversaries (FTO-designated al-Shabaab and foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida) is a key concern for Djiboutian senior principals: In separate meetings with Ambassador on July 9, the President of Djibouti's National Assembly, President Guelleh's national security advisor, the deputy director of the national security service, and FM Youssouf all highlighted the need to assist the TFG, as the TFG's defeat at the hands of the al-Shabaab would present a serious threat to U.S. and regional interests. END COMMENT.  
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